negative wealth effects, they figure prominently in the informationsignaling literature (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1985) . Thus, the responses of securities analysts to these events merit examination in order to pin down the nature of the information effect. Contrary to predictions implied in information signaling models, we find that Value Line analysts revise long-range and short-range earnings forecasts upward following call announcements.
In Section II we review the literature documenting and explaining negative call announcement effects. We then describe our sample and confirm that there are negative average call announcement effects for our convertible bonds (-1.168%) and convertible preferred stocks (-1.435%). Next we examine common stock prices before call announcements and compare them with prices at the end of conversion to determine how much of the announcement effect is transitory. The results show that all of the announcement effect is transitory for most of the firms in the sample. In Section III, we show that, on average, the short-term and long-term Value Line forecasts are revised upward following calls. The findings are summarized in Section IV.
II. Convertible Security Calls-Theory and Evidence

A. The Evidence and Explanations
Leverage-reducing decisions such as conversion-forcing calls of convertible securities may convey low confidence in future earnings (see Ross 1977; and Harris and Raviv 1985) .1 Consistent with this explanation, conversion-forcing calls of convertible bonds are found by Mikkelson (1981) to produce a significant negative average price effect (-2.13%), and convertible preferred stock calls are reported by Mais, Moore, and Rogers (1989) to produce a significant negative average price reaction (-1.60%).2 Consistent with the explanation based on impending earnings deterioration, Ofer and Natarajan (1987) report an average earnings decline subsequent to convertible bond calls based on a simple extrapolative model of earnings expectations. Mazzeo and Moore (1992) show that at least some of the negative announcement effect is transitory, consistent with a short-term liquid- ity effect, and the finding holds for calls of convertible bonds and convertible preferred stocks. They suggest that the negative price reaction is a temporary price reduction caused by selling pressure rather than negative information. Specifically, securities dealers respond to call announcements by lowering quoted bid and asked prices in an attempt to balance buy and sell orders as investors convert and sell their new shares. Also, Campbell, Ederington, and Vankudre (1991), after correcting for an inherent bias in preannouncement earnings growth rates examined in Ofer and Natarajan (1987) , show that earnings growth rates do not decline after calls. While the presence of a transitory component in the announcement return does not exclude a long-term information effect, it does raise the intriguing possibility that the information effect is not the dominant force. In addition, Asquith (1995) shows that almost all "in-the-money" convertible bonds in his sample are called quickly, which argues against an informationsignaling explanation. Given that our sample calls exhibit negative announcement effects, we now turn to the question of price recovery, namely, is the price decline permanent? The median number of calendar days in the conversion period (from the call announcement to the last day in which issues may be converted) is 31 for convertible bonds and 32 for convertible preferred stocks. A complete common stock price recovery over this period would support a short-term liquidity explanation and cast doubt on the validity of a negative information effect. The average price recovery can be examined by the ratio (PcEi/P-2-), where PcEi is the common stock price for the ith firm at the conversion expiration date, and P_2 is the common stock price for the ith firm 2 days before the call announcement is published in the financial press. If this ratio, on average, is greater than or equal to one, evidence is provided that common stock prices recover fully by the end of the conversion period.
B. Sample Selection
These tests include the firms in the sample that do not experience stock splits from 10 days before the announcement to the effective call date. Meeting these criteria are 33 of the 36 firms calling convertible preferred stocks and 75 of the 90 firms calling convertible bonds. Results of the analysis of the ratios are reported in table 1.
For the convertible bond sample, the mean ratio is 1.02834, significantly greater than 1.0 (t = 2.62) at the 5% level. The mean ratio for the preferred sample is 1.03743, also significantly greater than 1.0 (t = 2.47) at the 5% level.5 These values indicate that the average announcement effect is erased by the end of the conversion period. In addition, of the 75 price ratios for convertible bond calls, 44 (59%) exceed one. The binomial probability, with equal probabilities for price ratios greater than or less than one, of drawing such a sample is .0827. Of the 33 convertible preferred calls, 23 (70%) of the price ratios ex-4. See Byrd and Moore (1994) for a discussion of preevent estimation versus postevent estimation in computing the stock price reaction to convertible call announcements.
5. Normal theory confidence intervals for the 95% level lie above one. As a robustness check, we employ Efron's (1979) bootstrap using 1,000 iterations to establish a 95% confidence interval for the median price ratio. For convertible bond calls the interval for the median is [1.0070, 1.0196], and for convertible preferred calls it is [1.0000, 1.0159]. and convertible preferred stocks (N = 58), respectively, each followed by a 2.2% average cumulative abnormal return during the respective conversion periods. In figure 1, we give frequency histograms for the price ratios for the combined sample of 108 convertible calls (panel la), then convertible bond and preferred calls separately (panels lb and lc). The essence of the numerical values in table 1 is made even more apparent in figure la for the full sample. For reference, a normal density with mean 1.0311 is superimposed on the figure. From inspection of figures lb (mean = 1.0283) and Ic (mean = 1.0374), it is clear that the bulk of the distribution for each type of security call lies at or above one, indicating that the majority of negative price reactions at announcement are short-lived.
III. Earnings Forecast Revisions and Convertible Calls
The evidence that for most firms the announcement effect is transitory casts doubt on information signaling as the principal explanation. This finding suggests the need for an analysis aimed directly at detection of a signaling effect. Any change in financial policy that conveys information about firm value should be of interest to financial analysts. Therefore, if a conversion-forcing call announcement conveys negative information concerning the calling firm's future earnings, analysts should revise their earnings forecasts downward for that firm following the call announcement. Change in share price due to the call announcement is measured as follows:
In (2), Pt~1 is the closing price per share 1 day after the Wall Street Journal announcement date, and Pt_2 is the closing price immediately preceding the 2-day announcement period. The price change in (2) is the same as that used by Israel, Ofer, and Siegel (1989). We also perform the analysis employing a market-adjusted measure, namely, the 3-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) from the market model, over the same time period (from t = -2tot = +1).
We test the relationship between revisions in NOI forecasts subsequent to call announcements and changes in share price by estimating the parameters of the model (3) below:
ANOIe/NOIe = Do + AI APilPi + ei.
Equation (3) is also estimated with CARi substituted for AP1IP1. The analysis is done separately for changes in short-term (i.e., current year) and long-term forecasts (3-5 years ahead). If security calls portend bad news about firms' earnings, we expect the mean of ANOIe/NOIe to be negative, and we expect PIl in (3) to be positive for changes in long-term and short-term forecasts. In table 2 we present average long-and short-term NOI forecasts before and after calls of convertible bonds and preferred stocks and measure changes in these forecasts three ways: change in dollar forecast, percentage change in forecast, and the numbers of positive and negative revisions. The estimated mean change in NOI forecast is positive for long-and short-term forecasts following calls of convertible bonds and preferred stocks. The differences in means are statistically significant at the .05 level for changes in long-term forecasts following convertible bond calls (mean change = $17.79 million, t = 4.172), and for changes in short-term forecasts (mean = $5.99 million, t = 2.035). Average long-term forecast revisions pursuant to calls of convertible preferred stocks are also positive and significant at the .05 level (mean = $16.543 million, t = 2.222). Average differences in short-term forecasts are also positive (mean = $5.33 million), but significant at only the .10 level (t = 1.772). We conclude that the average earnings forecast is revised upward following convertible security calls, and the positive revision applies to both short-term and long-term forecasts of NOI.
Mean percentage changes in earnings forecasts are also reported in table 2, and these may be more illuminating than the dollar changes. Short-term forecasts are revised upward an average of over 4% for both types of calls (4.23% for bonds and 4.60% for preferreds).6
Average percentage changes in long-term forecasts are substantially larger for both types of security calls. The mean percentage revision for bond calls is 7.91%; the 95% confidence interval is (.0434, .1148). The numbers of negative revisions in forecasts of NOI, sales, and operating margins are reported in the last three rows of table 2. The number of negative revisions in long-term NOI is very small for convertible bond calls (9/69) and convertible preferred calls (5/27). It is interesting to note that the NOI revisions are not driven exclusively by either sales or margin forecast changes, as indicated in the last two rows of table 2. In the majority of cases for both types of securities revisions of NOI, sales and operating margin are nonnegative.
In figure 2, we give frequency histograms for percentage changes in NOIY (eq. [1]) for long-and short-term, for combined samples of both types of securities with normal densities superimposed. In panels 2a and 2b, we depict the histograms for convertible security calls, shortterm (N = 126) and long-term (N = 96) For convertible preferred calls (panel B), none of the estimated slope coefficients (PIl) is significantly different from zero. This is true regardless of whether APIP or CAR is used as the independent variable. We conclude that the data reveal no consistent and reliable relationship between Value Line forecast revisions and price reactions to call announcements, inconsistent with an information effect.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
We find that for most calls of convertible bonds and convertible preferred stocks in our sample, stock prices recover fully by the end of the conversion period. Thus, the widely documented negative announcement effect is transitory for most firms, inconsistent with an explanation based on information signaling. Also, forecasts of net operating income produced by Value Line analysts are found to be revised upward, on average, following calls of convertible bonds and preferred stocks. The average positive revision is exhibited for both short-term and long-term forecasts. The findings are also counter to what would be expected according to a variety of information-based stories linking firms' profitability and call strategies. Our regression results indicate that a positive relation between price effects and NOI forecast revisions is exhibited in only a subset of the data using ordinary least squares, and then only marginally so.
But the market does react negatively to such call announcements. Mazzeo and Moore (1992) conclude that the average price reaction has 8. White's (1980) test for heteroscedasticity indicates that ordinary least squares is appropriate. NOTE.-Values in parentheses are t-statistics for respective coefficient estimates. APIP = percentage change in closing price per share from day t = -2 to day t = + 1; CAR = cumulative abnormal return for 3-day announcement period, t = -2, + 1. a temporary component consistent with their market microstructure explanation. Our findings of no reliable linkage between earnings forecasts and price reactions are consistent with an explanation such as that of Mazzeo and Moore (1992) . While our findings may shed some light on the nature of call announcements, they also raise a prominent question. If earnings forecasts are elevated following calls, why does the market react negatively to the announcements? We speculate that the announcement effect may be due exclusively to a short-term phenomenon such as liquidity demand; that is, there may be no bad news associated with conversion-forcing calls.
